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Abstract—We present a machine learning framework that
leverages a mixture of metadata, network, and temporal fea-
tures to detect extremist users, and predict content adopters
and interaction reciprocity in social media. We exploit a
unique dataset containing millions of tweets generated by more
than 25 thousand users who have been manually identified,
reported, and suspended by Twitter due to their involvement
with extremist campaigns. We also leverage millions of tweets
generated by a random sample of 25 thousand regular users
who were exposed to, or consumed, extremist content. We carry
out three forecasting tasks, (i) to detect extremist users, (ii) to
estimate whether regular users will adopt extremist content,
and finally (iii) to predict whether users will reciprocate
contacts initiated by extremists. All forecasting tasks are set up
in two scenarios: a post hoc (time independent) prediction task
on aggregated data, and a simulated real-time prediction task.
The performance of our framework is extremely promising,
yielding in the different forecasting scenarios up to 93% AUC
for extremist user detection, up to 80% AUC for content
adoption prediction, and finally up to 72% AUC for interaction
reciprocity forecasting. We conclude by providing a thorough
feature analysis that helps determine which are the emerging
signals that provide predictive power in different scenarios.
1. Introduction
Researchers are devoting increasing attention to the is-
sues related to online extremism, terrorist propaganda and
radicalization campaigns [1], [2]. Social media play a cen-
tral role in these endeavors, as increasing evidence from
social science research suggests [3], [4]. For example, a
widespread consensus on the relationship between social
media usage and the rise of extremist groups like the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham (viz. ISIS) has emerged among
policymakers and security experts [5], [6], [7]. ISIS’ success
in increasing its roster to thousands of members has been
related in part to a savvy use of social media for propaganda
and recruitment purposes. One reason is that, until recently,
social media platform like Twitter provided a public venue
where single individuals, interest groups, or organizations,
were given the ability to carry out extremist discussions and
terrorist recruitment, without any form of restrictions, and
with the possibility of gathering audiences of potentially
millions. Only recently, some mechanisms have been put
into place, based on manual reporting, to limit these abu-
sive forms of communications. Based on this evidence, we
argue in favor of developing computational tools capable of
effectively analyzing massive social data streams, to detect
extremist users, to predict who will become involved in
interactions with radicalized users, and finally to determine
who is likely to consume extremist content. The goal of this
article is to address the three questions above by proposing
a computational framework for detection and prediction
of extremism in social media. We tapped into Twitter to
obtain a relevant dataset, leveraged expert crowd-sourcing
for annotation purposes, and then designed, trained and
tested the performance of our prediction system in static
and simulated real-time forecasts, as detailed below.
Contributions of this work
The main contributions of our work can be summarized as:
• We formalize three different forecasting tasks related
to online extremism, namely the detection of ex-
tremist users, the prediction of adoption of extremist
content, and the forecasting of interaction reciprocity
between regular users and extremists.
• We propose a machine prediction framework that
analyzes social media data and generates features
across multiple dimensions, including user metadata,
network statistics, and temporal patterns of activity,
to perform the three forecasting tasks above.
• We leverage an unprecedented dataset that contains
over 3 millions tweets generated by over 25 thou-
sand extremist accounts, who have been manually
identified, reported, and suspended by Twitter. We
also use around 30 million tweets generated by a
random sample of 25 thousand regular users who
were exposed to, or consumed, extremist content.
• For each forecasting task, we design two variants:
a post-hoc (time independent) prediction task per-
formed on aggregated data, and a simulated real-time
forecast where the learning models are trained as if
data were available up to a certain point in time, and
the system must generate predictions on the future.
• We conclude our analysis by studying the predictive
power of the different features employed for predic-
tion, to determine their role in the three forecasts.
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2. Data and Preliminary Analysis
In this section we describe our dataset, the curation strat-
egy yielding the annotations, and some preliminary analysis.
2.1. Sample selection and curation
In this work we rely on data and labels constructed by
using a procedure of manual curation and expert verification.
We retrieved on a public Website a list of over 25 thousands
Twitter accounts whose activity was labeled as supportive
of the Islamic State by the crowd-sourcing initiative called
Lucky Troll Club. The goal of this project was to leverage
annotators with expertise in Arabic languages to identify
ISIS accounts and report them to Twitter. Twitter’s anti-
abuse team manually verifies all suspension requests, and
grants some based on the active violation of Twitter’s Terms
of Service policy against terrorist- or extremist-related ac-
tivity. Here we focus on the 25,538 accounts that have been
all suspended between January and June 2015 by Twitter as
a consequence of evidence of activity supporting the Islamic
State group. For each account, we also have at our disposal
information about the suspension date, and the number of
followers of that user as of the suspension date.
2.2. Twitter data collection
The next step of our study consisted in collecting data
related to the activity of the 25,538 ISIS supporters on Twit-
ter. To this purpose, we leveraged the Twitter gardenhose
data source (roughly 10% of the Twitter stream) collected
by Indiana University [8]. We decided to collect not only the
tweets generated by these accounts prior to their suspension,
but also to build a dataset of their targets. In particular,
we are concerned with accounts unrelated to ISIS with
whom the ISIS supporters tried to establish some forms
of interaction. We therefore constructed the following two
datasets:
ISIS accounts: this dataset contains 3,395,901 tweets gen-
erated in the time interval January-June 2015 by the 25,538
accounts identified by Twitter as supporters of ISIS. This is
a significant portion of all the accounts suspended by Twitter
in relation to ISIS.1
Users exposed to ISIS: this dataset contains 29,193,267
tweets generated during January-June 2015 by a set of 25
thousand users randomly sampled among the larger set of
users that constitute ISIS accounts’ followers. This set is by
choice of equal size to the former one, to avoid introducing
class imbalance issues.
For prediction purposes, we will use as positive and
negative labels the ISIS accounts group and the accounts
in the users exposed to ISIS, respectively.
1. The Guardian recently reported that between April 2015 and February
2016, Twitter’s anti-terror task force suspended about 125,000 accounts
linked to ISIS extremists: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/
feb/05/twitter-deletes-isis-accounts-terrorism-online
3. Methodology
In this section we discuss the learning models and the
features adopted by our framework. The complete prediction
pipeline (learning models, cross validation, feature selection,
and performance evaluation) is developed using Python and
the scikit-learn library [9].
3.1. Learning models
We adopt two off-the-shelf learning models as a proof of
concept for the three classification tasks that we will discuss
later (see §4): Logistic Regression and Random Forests.
Logistic Regression: The first implemented algorithm is a
simple Logistic Regression (LR) with LASSO regulariza-
tion. The advantage of this approach is its scalability, which
makes it very effective to (possibly real-time) classification
tasks on large datasets. The only parameter to tune is the
loss function C. We expect that LR will provide the baseline
classification and prediction performance.
Random Forests: We also use a state-of-the-art implemen-
tation of Random Forests (RF) [10]. The vectors fed into
the learning models represent each user’s features. Random
Forests are trained using 100 estimators and adopting the
Gini coefficient to measure the quality of splits. Optimal pa-
rameters setting is obtained via cross validation (see 3.1.1).
Note that the goal of this work is not to provide new
machine learning techniques, but to illustrate that existing
methods can provide promising results. We also explored
additional learning models (e.g., SVM, Stochastic Gradient
Descent, etc.), which provide comparable prediction perfor-
mance but are less computationally efficient and scalable.
3.1.1. Cross validation. The results of our performance
evaluation (see §4) are all obtained via k-fold cross val-
idation. We adopt k = 5 folds, and therefore use 80% of
data for training, and the remainder 20% for testing purpose,
averaging performance scores across the 5 folds. We also use
5-fold cross validation to optimize the parameters of the two
learning algorithms (LR and RF), by means of an exhaustive
cross-validated grid search on the hyperparameter space.
3.1.2. Evaluation scores. We benchmark the performance
of our system by using four standard prediction quality
measures, namely Precision, Recall, F1 (harmonic mean of
Precision and Recall), and AUC—short for Area Under the
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [11].
3.2. Feature engineering and feature selection
We manually crafted a set of 52 features belonging to
three different classes: user metadata, timing features, and
network statistics, as detailed below.
User metadata and activity features: User metadata have
been proved pivotal to model classes of users in social
media [12], [13]. We build user-based features leveraging
the metadata provided by the Twitter API related to the
TABLE 1. LIST OF 52 FEATURES EXTRACTED BY OUR FRAMEWORK
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Number of followers
Number of friends (i.e., followees)
Number of posted tweets
Number of favorite tweets
Ratio of retweets / tweets
Ratio of mentions / tweets
Avg number of hashtags
(avg, var) number of retweets
Avg. number of mentions
Avg. number of mentions (excluding retweets)
Number of URLs in profile description
(avg, std, min, max, proportion) URLs in tweets
Length of username
Ti
m
in
g (avg, var) number of tweets per day
(avg, std, min, max) interval between two consecutive tweets
(avg, std, min, max) interval between two consecutive retweets
(avg, std, min, max) interval between two consecutive mentions
N
et
w
.s
ta
ts (avg, std, min, max) distribution of retweeters’ number of followers
(avg, std, min, max) distribution of retweeters’ number of friends
(avg, std, min, max) distribution of mentioners’ number of followers
(avg, std, min, max) distribution of mentioners’ number of friends
(avg, std, min, max) number of retweets of the tweets by others
author of each tweet, as well as the source of each retweet.
User features include the number of tweets, followers and
friends associated to each users, the frequency of adoption
of hashtags, mentions, and URLs, and finally some profile
descriptors. In total, 18 user metadata and activity features
are computed (cf. Table 1).
Timing features: Important insights may be concealed by
the temporal dimension of content production and consump-
tion, as illustrated by recent work [14], [15]. A basic timing
feature is the average number of tweets posted per day. Other
timing features include statistics (average, standard devi-
ation, minimum, maximum) of the intervals between two
consecutive events, e.g., two tweets, retweets, or mentions.
Our framework generates 14 timing features (cf. Table 1).
Network statistics: Twitter content spreads from person
to person via retweets and mentions. We expect that the
emerging network structure carries important information to
characterize different types of communication. Prior work
shows that using network features significantly helps pre-
diction tasks like social bot detection [8], [13], [15], and
campaign detection [16], [17]. Our framework focuses on
two types of networks: (i) retweet, and (ii) mention net-
works. Users are nodes of such networks, and retweets or
mentions are directed links between pairs of users. For each
user, our framework computes the distribution of followers
and friends of all users who retweet and mention that user,
and extracts some descriptive statistics (average, standard
deviation, minimum, maximum) of these distributions. Our
system builds 20 network statistics features (cf. Table 1).
3.2.1. Greedy feature selection. Our framework generates
a set F of |F | = 52 features. In our type of prediction tasks,
some features exhibit more predictive power than others:
temporal dependencies introduce strong correlations among
some features, thus some possible redundancy. Among the
different existing ways to select the most relevant features
for the prediction task at hand [18], in the interest of com-
putational efficiency, we adopted a simple greedy forward
feature selection method, as follows: (i) initialize the set of
selected features S = ∅; (ii) for each feature f ∈ F − S,
consider the union set U = S ∪ f ; (iii) train the classifier
using the features in U ; (iv) test the average performance of
the classifier trained on this set; (v) add to S the feature that
provides the best performance; (vi) repeat (ii)-(v) as long as
a significant performance increase is yield.
4. Experiments
In the following, we formalize three different prediction
problems related to online extremism:
Task I (T1): Detection of extremist supporters. The first
task that our system will face is a binary classification aimed
to detect ISIS accounts and separate them from those of
regular users. The problem is to test whether any predictive
signal is present in the set of features we designed to charac-
terize social media activity related to extremism, and serves
as a yardstick for the next two more complex problems.
Task II (T2): Predicting extremist content adoption.
The set of 25 thousand users we randomly sampled among
followers of ISIS accounts can be leveraged to perform
the prediction of extremist content adoption. We define
as a positive instance of adoption in this context when a
regular user retweets some content s/he is exposed to that
is generated by an ISIS account.
Task III (T3): Predicting interactions with extremists.
The third task presents likely the most difficult challenge:
predicting whether a regular user will engage into interac-
tions with extremists. A positive instance of interaction is
represented by a regular user replying to a contact initiated
by an ISIS account.
Static versus real-time predictions. For each of the three
prediction tasks described above, we identified two modali-
ties, namely a static (time independent) and a simulated real-
time prediction. In the former scenario, a static prediction
ignores temporal dependencies in that the system aggregates
all data available across the entire time range (January-
June 2015), and then performs training and testing using
the 5-fold cross validation strategy by randomly splitting
datapoints into the 5 folds and averaging the prediction
performance across folds. In the latter scenario, a real-
time prediction is simulated in which data are processed
for training and testing purposes by respecting the timeline
of content availability: for example, the system can exploit
the first month of available data (January 2015) for training,
and then producing predictions for the remainder 5 months
(Feb-Jun 2015), for which performance is tested.
The performance of our framework in the three tasks,
each with the two prediction modalities, is discussed in the
following. The section concludes with the analysis of feature
predictive power (see §4.4).
Figure 1. T1B: Feature selection analysis and feature rank distribution (top 11 features)
4.1. T1: Detection of extremist supporters
In the following we discuss the static (T1A) and real-
time (T1B) scenarios for the first prediction task, namely
detecting extremist accounts on Twitter.
4.1.1. T1A: Time-independent detection. The detection
of extremist user accounts is the most natural task to start
the performance evaluation of our framework. Our analysis
aims at verifying that the 52 features we carefully hand-
crafted indeed carry some predictive signal useful to separate
extremist users from regular ones. The dataset at hand
contains two roughly equal-sized classes (about 25 thousand
instances each), where ISIS accounts are labeled as positive
instances, and regular users as negative ones. Each instance
is a characterized by a 52-dimensional vector, and positive
and negative examples are fed to the two learning models
(LR and RF). The first task, in short T1A, is agnostic of
time dependencies: data are aggregated throughout the entire
6 months period (January-June 2015) and training/testing
is performed in a traditional 5-fold cross-validated fashion
(cf. §3.1.1). Table 2 summarizes the performance of LR and
RF according to the four quality measures described above
(cf. 3.1.2): Both models perform well, with Random Forests
achieving an accuracy above 87% as measured by AUC.
These results are encouraging and demonstrate that simple
off-the-shelf models can yield good performance in T1A.
TABLE 2. EXTREMISTS DETECTION (T1A)
Precision Recall F1 AUC
Logistic Regression 0.778 0.506 0.599 0.756
Random Forests 0.855 0.893 0.874 0.871
4.1.2. T1B: Simulated real-time detection. A more com-
plex variant of this prediction task is by taking into account
the temporal dimension. Our prior work has demonstrated
that accounting for temporal dependencies is very valuable
in social media prediction tasks and significantly improves
prediction performance [17]: therefore we expect that the
performance of our framework in a simulated real-time
prediction task will exceed that of the static scenario.
In this simulated real-time prediction task, T1B, we
divide the available data into temporal slices used separately
for training and prediction purposes. Table 3 reports five
columns, each of which defines a scenario where one or
more months of data are aggregated for training, and the
rest is used for prediction and performance evaluation.
For example, in the first column, the learning models are
trained on data from January 2015, and the prediction are
performed and evaluated on future data in the interval
February-June 2015.
Random Forests greatly benefits from accounting for
temporal dependencies in the data, and the prediction per-
formance as measured by AUC ranges between 83.8% (with
just one month of training data) to an excellent 93.2%
(with five months of training data). Fig. 1(left) illustrates the
ranking of the top 11 features identified by feature selection,
as a function of the number of months of data in the training
set. Fig. 1(right) displays the distributions of the rankings of
each feature across the 5 different temporal slices. For the
extremist users detection task, the most predictive features
are (1) number of tweets, (2) average number of hashtags,
and (3) average number of retweets. One hypothesis is that
extremist users are more active than average users, and
therefore exhibit distinctive patterns related to volume and
frequency of activity.
TABLE 3. REAL-TIME EXTREMISTS DETECTION (T1B)
Training: Jan Jan-Feb Jan-Mar Jan-Apr Jan-May
Testing: Feb-Jun Mar-Jun Apr-Jun May-Jun Jun
AUC (LR) 0.743 0.753 0.655 0.612 0.602
Precision (LR) 0.476 0.532 0.792 0.816 0.796
Recall (LR) 0.629 0.675 0.377 0.289 0.275
F1 (LR) 0.542 0.595 0.511 0.427 0.409
AUC (RF) 0.838 0.858 0.791 0.942 0.932
Precision (RF) 0.984 0.922 0.868 0.931 0.910
Recall (RF) 0.679 0.733 0.649 0.957 0.959
F1 (RF) 0.804 0.817 0.743 0.944 0.934
4.2. T2: Predicting extremist content adoption
The second task, namely predicting the adoption of
extremist content by regular users, is discussed in the static
(T2A) and real-time (T2B) scenarios in the following.
4.2.1. T2A: Time-independent prediction. The first in-
stance of T2 is again on the time-aggregated datasets span-
ning January-June 2015. Predicting content adoption is a
known challenging task, and a wealth of literature has ex-
plored the factors behind online information contagion [19].
Figure 2. T2B: Feature selection analysis and feature rank distribution (top 11 features)
In this scenario, we aim to predict whether a regular user
will retweet a content produced by an ISIS account. Positive
instances are represented by users who retweeted at least one
ISIS tweet in the aggregated time period, while negative
ones are all users exposed to such tweets who did not
retweet any of them. Table 4 summarizes the performance
of our models: Random Forests emerges again as the best
performer, although the gap with Logistic Regression is
narrow, and the latter provides significantly better Recall.
Overall, T2A appears clearly more challenging than T1A, as
the top performance yields a 77.1% AUC score. The results
on the static prediction are promising and set a good baseline
for the real-time prediction scenario, discussed next.
TABLE 4. CONTENT ADOPTION PREDICTION (T2A)
Precision Recall F1 AUC
Logistic Regression 0.433 0.813 0.565 0.755
Random Forests 0.745 0.615 0.674 0.771
4.2.2. T2B: Simulated real-time prediction. We again
consider temporal data dependencies to simulate a real-time
prediction for T2. Similarly to T1B, in T2B we preserve
the temporal ordering of data, and divide the dataset in
training and testing according to month-long temporal slices,
as summarized by Table 5. Random Forests again seems
to benefit from the temporal correlations in the data, and
the prediction performance at peak improves up to 80.2%
AUC. Logistic Regression fails again at exploiting tempo-
ral information, showing some performance deterioration if
compared to T2A. Fig. 2 shows that, for the content adoption
prediction, the ranking of the top 11 features in T2B is
less stable than that of T1B. The top three most predictive
features for this task are (1) ratio of retweets over tweets,
(2) number of tweets, and (3) average number of retweets.
Note that the latter two top features also appear in the top
3 of the previous task, suggesting an emerging pattern of
feature predictive dynamics.
4.3. T3: Predicting interactions with extremists
Our third and last task, namely the prediction of inter-
actions between regular users and extremists, is discussed
in the following, again separately for the static (T3A) and
real-time (T3B) scenarios.
TABLE 5. REAL-TIME CONTENT ADOPTION PREDICTION (T2B)
Training: Jan Jan-Feb Jan-Mar Jan-Apr Jan-May
Testing: Feb-Jun Mar-Jun Apr-Jun May-Jun Jun
AUC (LR) 0.682 0.674 0.673 0.703 0.718
Precision (LR) 0.188 0.240 0.148 0.116 0.043
Recall (LR) 0.814 0.367 0.345 0.725 0.362
F1 (LR) 0.305 0.290 0.207 0.199 0.077
AUC (RF) 0.565 0.598 0.676 0.779 0.802
Precision (RF) 0.433 0.384 0.266 0.205 0.070
Recall (RF) 0.087 0.070 0.336 0.648 0.813
F1 (RF) 0.145 0.119 0.297 0.311 0.130
4.3.1. T3A: Time-independent prediction. We expect the
interaction prediction task to be the most challenging among
the three tasks we proposed. Similarly to content adoption
prediction, recent literature has explored the daunting chal-
lenge of predicting interaction reciprocity and intensity in
social media [20]. Consistently with the prior two tasks, our
first approach to interaction prediction is time agnostic: we
plan to test whether our system is capable to predict whether
a regular user who is mentioned by an extremist account
will reply back or not. In this case, positive instances are
represented by users who reply to at least one contact
initiated by ISIS in the aggregated time period (January-June
2015), whereas negative instances are those regular users
who did not reply to any ISIS contact. Table 6 reports the
prediction performance of our two models: overall, the task
proves challenging as expected, being Random Forests the
best performer, yielding excellent Recall and 69.2% AUC.
Logistic Regression provides fair performance with a 65.8%
AUC score, and both Precision and Recall around 69%.
TABLE 6. INTERACTION RECIPROCITY PREDICTION (T3A)
Precision Recall F1 AUC
Logistic Regression 0.697 0.690 0.693 0.658
Random Forests 0.686 0.830 0.751 0.692
4.3.2. T3B: Simulated real-time prediction. The final task
discussed in this paper is the interaction prediction with
temporal data. Given the complexity of this problem, as
demonstrated by T3A, we plan to test whether incorporat-
ing the temporal dimension will help our models achieve
better performance. Table 7 shows that this appears to be
the case: Random Forests exhibits an improved temporal
prediction performance, boasting up to 72.6% AUC, using
the first 5 months of data for traning, and the last month for
Figure 3. T3B: Feature selection analysis and feature rank distribution (top 11 features)
prediction and evaluation. Logistic Regression improves as
well, jumping to a 68.3% AUC score. Both models provide
very good Precision/Recall performance, if one considers
the challenging nature of predicting interaction reciprocity
within our context. Fig. 3 summarizes the top 11 features
ranking, this time showing a more clear division among top
features. The top three features in the interaction reciprocity
prediction are (1) ratio of retweets over tweets, (2) average
number of hashtags, and (3) average number of retweets.
Note that all three features already occurred in the top
features of the two previous tasks, reinforcing the notion of
a clear pattern of feature predictive power, discussed next.
TABLE 7. REAL-TIME INTERACTION RECIPROCITY PREDICTION (T3B)
Training: Jan Jan-Feb Jan-Mar Jan-Apr Jan-May
Testing: Feb-Jun Mar-Jun Apr-Jun May-Jun Jun
AUC (LR) 0.610 0.589 0.618 0.638 0.683
Precision (LR) 0.562 0.560 0.574 0.553 0.367
Recall (LR) 0.720 0.775 0.813 0.783 0.647
F1 (LR) 0.631 0.650 0.672 0.649 0.468
AUC (RF) 0.628 0.633 0.649 0.671 0.726
Precision (RF) 0.614 0.627 0.603 0.637 0.542
Recall (RF) 0.779 0.676 0.641 0.717 0.765
F1 (RF) 0.687 0.650 0.621 0.675 0.634
4.4. Feature predictive-power analysis
We conclude our analysis by discussing the predictive
power of the features adopted by our framework. First, the
choice to focus on the top 11 features, rather than the more
traditional top 10, is justified by the occurrence of two ex ae-
quo in the final ranking of top features, displayed in Table 8.
Here, we report the ranking of the top 11 features in the
three tasks above. Feature selection is performed on the real-
time prediction tasks (not on the time-aggregated ones). This
analysis captures the essence of the predictive value of our
hand-crafted features in the context of real-time predictions.
A clear pattern emerges: (1) ratio of retweets over tweets,
(2) average number of hashtags, (2 ex-aequo) number of
tweets, and (4) average number of retweets, consistently
ranked in the top features for the three different prediction
tasks. This insight is encouraging: all these features can be
easily computed from the metadata reported by the Twitter
API, and therefore could be potentially implemented in a
real-time detection and prediction system operating on the
Twitter stream with unparalleled efficiency.
TABLE 8. FEATURE RANKING ACROSS THE 3 PREDICTION TASKS
Feature Rank: T1B T2B T3B Final
Ratio of retweets / tweets 4 1 1 1
Avg number of hashtags 2 4 2 2
Number of tweets 1 2 5 =
Avg number of retweets 3 3 3 4
Avg tweets per day 5 8 4 5
Avg no. mentions (w/out retweets) 8 5 8 6
Number of followers 7 6 9 7
Number of friends 6 11 7 8
Avg number of mentions 11 9 6 9
Var tweets / day 9 7 10 =
Ratio of mentions / tweets 10 10 11 11
5. Related Literature
Two relevant research trends recently emerged in the
computational social sciences and in the computer science
communities, discussed separately in the following.
Computational social sciences research. This research line
is concerned more with understanding the social phenomena
revolving around extremist propaganda using online data as
a proxy to study individual and group behaviors. Various
recent studies focus on English- and Arabic-speaking au-
diences online to study the effect of ISIS’ propaganda and
radicalization. One example of the former is the work by
Berger and collaborators that provided quantitative evidence
of ISIS’ use of social media for propaganda. In a 2015
study [21], the authors characterized the Twitter population
of ISIS supporters, quantifying its size, provenance, and
organization. They argued that most of ISIS’ success on
Twitter is due to a restricted number of highly-active ac-
counts (500-1000 users). Our analysis illustrates that indeed
a limited number of ISIS accounts achieved a very high
visibility and followership. Berger’s subsequent work [22]
however suggested that ISIS’ reach (at least among English
speakers) has stalled for months as of the beginning of 2016,
due to more aggressive account suspension policies enacted
by Twitter. Again, a limited amount of English accounts
sympathetic to ISIS was found (less than one thousand),
and these users were mostly interacting with each other,
while being only marginally successful at acquiring other
users’ attention. This analysis suggests a mechanism of
diminishing returns for extremist social media propaganda.
Using Twitter data as a historical archive, some re-
searchers [23] recently tried to unveil the roots of support for
ISIS among the Arabic-speaking population. Their analysis
seems to suggest that supporters of the extremist group
have been discussing about Arab Spring uprisings in the
past significantly more than those who oppose ISIS on
Twitter. Although their method to separate ISIS supporters
from opposers is simplistic, the findings relating narrative
framing and recruitment mechanisms are compatible with
the literature on social protest phenomena [24], [25], [26].
A few studies explored alternative data sources: one
interesting example is the work by Vergani and Bliuc [27]
that uses sentiment analysis (Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count [28]) to investigate how language evolved across
the first 11 Issues of Dabiq, the flagship ISIS propaganda
magazine. Their analysis offers some insights about ISIS
radicalization motives, emotions and concerns. For example,
the authors found that ISIS has become increasingly con-
cerned with females, reflecting their need to attract women
to create their utopia society, not revolving around warriors
but around families. ISIS also seems to have increased the
use of internet jargon, possibly to connect with the identities
of young individuals online.
Computer science research. This research stream concerns
more with the machine learning and data aspects, to model,
detect, and/or predict social phenomena such as extremism
or radicalization often with newly-developed techniques.
One of the first computational frameworks, proposed
by Bermingham et al. [29] in 2009, combined social net-
work analysis with sentiment detection tools to study the
agenda of a radical YouTube group: the authors examined
the topics discussed within the group and their polarity, to
model individuals’ behavior and spot signs of extremism and
intolerance, seemingly more prominent among female users.
The detection of extremist content (on the Web) was also the
focus of a 2010 work by Qi et al. [30]. The authors applied
hierarchical clustering to extremist Web pages to divide
them into different categories (religious, politics, etc.).
Scanlon and Gerber proposed the first method to detect
cyber-recruitment efforts in 2014 [31]. They exploited data
retrieved from the Dark Web Portal Project [32], a repository
of posts compiled from 28 different online fora on extremist
religious discussions (e.g., Jihadist) translated from Arabic
to English. After annotating a sample of posts as recruitment
efforts or not, the authors use Bayesian criteria and a set of
textual features to classify the rest of the corpus, obtaining
good accuracy, and highlighted the most predictive terms.
Along the same trend, Agarwal and Sureka proposed
different machine learning strategies [33], [34], [35], [36]
aimed at detecting radicalization efforts, cyber recruitment,
hate promotion, and extremist support in a variety of online
platforms, including YouTube, Twitter and Tumblr. Their
frameworks leverage features of contents and metadata,
and combinations of crawling and unsupervised clustering
methods, to study the online activity of Jihadist groups on
the platforms mentioned above.
Concluding, two very recent articles [37], [38] explore
the activity of ISIS on social media. The former [37] fo-
cuses on Twitter and aims at detecting users who exhibit
signals of behavioral change in line with radicalization: the
authors suggest that out of 154K users only about 700 show
significant signs of possible radicalization, and that may be
due to social homophily rather than the mere exposure to
propaganda content. The latter study [38] explores a set of
196 pro-ISIS aggregates operating on VKontakte (the most
popular Russian online social network) and involving about
100K users, to study the dynamics of survival of such groups
online: the authors suggest that the development of large
and potentially influential pro-ISIS groups can be hindered
by targeting and shutting down smaller ones. For additional
pointers we refer the interested reader to two recent literature
reviews on this topic [39], [40].
6. Conclusions
In this article we presented the problem of predicting
online extremism in social media. We defined three machine
learning tasks, namely the detection of extremist users, the
prediction of extremist content adoption, and the forecasting
of interactions between extremist users and regular users.
We tapped into the power of a crowd-sourcing project that
aimed at manually identifying and reporting suspicious or
abusive activity related to ISIS radicalization and propa-
ganda agenda, and collected annotations to build a ground-
truth of over 25 thousand suspended Twitter accounts. We
extracted over three million tweets related to the activity of
these accounts in the period of time between January and
June 2015. We also randomly identified an equal-sized set
of regular users exposed to the extremist content generated
by the ISIS accounts, and collected almost 30 million tweets
generated by the regular users in the same period of time.
By means of state-of-the-art learning models we man-
aged to accomplish predictions in two types of scenarios,
a static one that ignores temporal dependencies, and a
simulated real-time case in which data are processed for
training and testing by respecting the timeline of content
availability. The two learning models, and the set of 52
features that we carefully crafted, proved very effective in all
of the six combinations of forecasts (three prediction tasks
each with two prediction modalities, static and real-time).
The best performance in terms of AUC ranges between 72%
and 93%, depending on the complexity of the considered
task and the amount of training data available to the system.
We concluded our analysis by investigating the predic-
tive power of different features. We focused on the top 11
most significant features, and we discovered that some of
them, such as the ratio of retweets to tweets, the average
number of hashtags adopted, the sheer number of tweets,
and the average number of retweets generated by each user,
systematically rank very high in terms of predictive power.
Our insights shed light on the dynamics of extremist content
production as well as some of the network and timing
patterns that emerge in this type of online conversation.
Our work is far from concluded: for the future, we plan
to identify more realistic and complex prediction tasks, to
analyze the network and temporal dynamics of extremist
discussion, and to deploy a prototype system that allows for
real-time detection of signatures of abuse on social media.
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